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INMATES’ E-MAILS WITH THEIR ATTORNEYS:
OFF-LIMITS FOR THE GOVERNMENT?
Amelia H. Barry+
It is commonly understood that a conversation with one’s attorney is
protected. 1 This attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest evidentiary
privileges in the common law.2 It exists to incentivize lawyers and their clients
to have forthcoming conversations, which furthers the truth-seeking function of
the legal system.3
The attorney-client privilege is especially important for inmates, who
otherwise have very little power to communicate privately, free from
government surveillance.4 An inmate’s right to speak privately with counsel
during a legal proceeding is a “fundamental right.” 5 Therefore, when a
+

J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.,
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invaluable edits. The author would also like to thank her colleagues on the Catholic University
Law Review for their work on this Comment.
1. See Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[P]eople generally
believe conversations with their attorneys will be kept privileged and confidential.”); see also
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (citing 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)) (“Confidential disclosures by a
client to an attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance are privileged.”); Lance Cole, Revoking
Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement’s Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege
(And Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 474–75 (2003) (explaining that the attorneyclient privilege exists in both the federal jurisdiction and all state jurisdictions, and that it is rooted
in the idea that the lawyer owes his client loyalty and cannot testify against his client).
2. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note
1); see also Cole, supra note 1, at 474 (describing the age of the history of the privilege).
3. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully
informed by the client.”); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951
F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that the attorney-client privilege furthers “the
functioning of our legal system, by protecting the confidentiality of communications between
clients and their attorneys”).
4. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984) (stating that inmates are not entitled
to a “subjective expectation of privacy” in their prison cells); Laurie L. Levenson, LEVENSON ON
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5:76 (Thomson West 2014) (2011) (“[E]lectronic
surveillance or eavesdropping does not make overheard statements of prisoners inadmissible.”); 1
JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 3:6 (2015) (noting
an inmate’s “diminished privacy expectation” while incarcerated); 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 57 (2014)
(“[A] prisoner generally cannot expect to enjoy the same right to privacy that a person in free
society does, and with the exception of limited circumstances involving a special relationship, an
inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy in jailhouse conversations.”); see also United
States v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that although there is a diminished
expectation of privacy for inmates, they still have the protection of the attorney-client privilege).
5. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 758–59 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The Coplon court held:
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conversation between an attorney and his client was overheard or intercepted,
courts have found it necessary to vacate the judgment against the client.6
However, recently, courts have determined that the privilege protects an
inmate’s in-person, telephonic, or mail correspondence with his attorney, but not
communications transmitted via e-mail. 7 E-mail is quickly replacing other
forms of communication between inmates and attorneys because of its ease and
efficiency.8 However, despite its growing use, e-mails do not receive the same

The sanctity of the constitutional right of an accused privately to consult with counsel is
generally recognized and zealously enforced by state as well as federal courts. The court
said in Ex parte Rider: “The right of an accused, confined in jail or other place of
detention pending a trial of the charge against him, to have an opportunity to consult
freely with his counsel without any third person, whose presence is objectionable to the
accused, being present to hear what passes between the accused and his counsel, is one
of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the American criminal law—a right that no
Legislature or court can ignore or violate.”
Id. at 758 (citation omitted).
6. See id. at 759 (explaining that the defendant and his lawyer had a right not to have their
phone call monitored by the prosecution and that even if they had ample opportunity to
communicate via in-person communications, that would not “erase the blot of unconstitutionality
from the act of intercepting other consultations”). See also O’Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345,
345–46 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court vacated the petitioner’s conviction
and remanded for a new trial where the government introduced evidence that had been obtained
through eavesdropping on the petitioner and his attorney); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 26–
29 (1966).
7. Stephanie Clifford, Prosecutors Are Reading Emails From Inmates to Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/nyregion/us-is-reading-inmatesemail-sent-to-lawyers.html?_r=0. See United States v. Walia, No. 14–CR–213, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 102246, at *47–50 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014) (holding that the petitioner-inmate’s e-mail
connection with his attorney was not protected by the attorney-client privilege and that the myriad
of alternative means of confidential communication weigh against e-mail as a fundamental right);
United States v. Asaro, No. 14–Cr–26, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. July 17,
2014) (stating that an inmate’s e-mail increased access to the outside, but the lack of protected
communication “d[id] not rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation”); see also F.T.C. v.
Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *5–6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20,
2012) (holding that the defendants waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to e-mail
communications because the prison facility e-mail system required users to consent to monitoring
and warned that communications with attorneys were not privileged).
8. Robert E. Crotty, Chapter 62: Litigation Management by Law Firms, in 4A COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 62:41 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2014)
(“Communication via e-mail avoids some of the limitations of telephonic communication and is
increasingly becoming the standard method of communication between inside and outside
counsel.”); Matthew A. Piekarski, Note, E-Mail Content’s Brush with the Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy: The Warshak Decision, 47 U. LOUSIVILLE L. REV. 771, 771 (2009) (noting that changes
in the communications world often begot “allegations that the government is violating its citizens’
Fourth Amendment rights,” and attributing these disputes to the government’s failure to adapt);
Sean M. O’Brien, Note, Extending the Attorney-Client Privilege: Do Internet E-Mail
Communications Warrant A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 4 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 187, 187 (1999) (explaining e-mail users’ expectations of privacy).
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protection as traditional attorney-client communication. 9 To understand this
inconsistency, it is necessary to analyze the attorney-client privilege’s general
underpinnings.
The attorney-client privilege exists to facilitate the open and free exchange of
information between attorneys and their clients so that attorneys are able to
provide the best legal advice possible.10 The privilege applies to instances when
an attorney and his client intend their communication to be confidential.11 Every
state recognizes an attorney-client privilege,12 and the federal judiciary includes
the privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence.13
When applied to inmates, the attorney-client privilege has historically existed
for three forms of communication: in-person visits, letters, and phone calls.14
First, with regard to the privilege for in-person visits, inmates and their attorneys
are entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy, even when interviews are
conducted in a police interview room. 15 Therefore, prisons must provide an
adequate environment for a private conversation to take place.16
9. See Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *47–50; Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97396, at *3–4; F.T.C., 2012 WL 171621, at *7–8.
10. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (explaining that a client has a privilege of
“secrecy upon communications between client and attorney” to facilitate the “administration of
justice”).
11. In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (stating that the attorney-client
privilege only exists for communications that the parties intend to be confidential). In United States
v. Fisher, the court said that the privilege applies when,
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b)
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
United States v. Fisher, 692 F. Supp. 488, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (citing United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950)).
12. William P. Matthews, Comment, Encoded Confidences: Electronic Mail, the Internet,
and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 280 (1996) (noting that most
codifications of the attorney-client privilege “offer[] the same protection the common law
afforded”).
13. FED. R. EVID. 501.
14. See Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (dealing with visits);
United States v. Korbe, 2:09-CR-05, 2010 WL 2776337, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 14, 2010) (regarding
phone calls); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 902 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (covering mail
communications).
15. Gennusa, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1349 (explaining that the recording of the conversation
between the client and his attorney violated the Fourth Amendment and the Wiretapping Act
because the parties had a reasonable expectation of privacy).
16. See Mitchell, 421 F. Supp. at 891, 902. In Mitchell, the prison had provided “inadequate
facilities which [were] devoid of privacy” for attorney meetings and the hours were also very
restricted for these meetings. Id. at 891. The court ordered the jail to provide normal visiting hours
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Second, based on the Supreme Court’s application of the privilege to mail,
lower courts require inmates and their lawyers to specifically mark
communications to each other as “privileged.”17 Lower courts generally agree
that prisons cannot open mail from an inmate’s attorney unless the inmate is
present.18
Third, with regard to phone calls, many prison phone systems do not record
conversations with an attorney.19 Prisons often maintain lists of local attorneys,
allowing inmates to add their attorney to the list so that calls with that attorney
are not monitored.20 However, when a warning that the prison is monitoring the
phone call is played, the call is not protected by the attorney-client privilege
because the parties cannot reasonably expect privacy.21
Recently, there have been two major changes to the attorney-client privilege
in the context of inmates’ communications. The first occurred after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.22 The attacks prompted the Federal Bureau
of Prisons to change its guidelines to allow for the monitoring and review of
certain communications between inmates and their attorneys.23 Under the new
regulations, if the Attorney General certifies that there is “reasonable suspicion”
that the communications are being used to facilitate terrorism, then the
government may view the communications.24
The second development centered on inmates’ use of e-mail to communicate
with their attorneys.25 Outside of the inmate context, courts have found that efor attorneys and a space for these meetings that could provide for a confidential conversation. Id.
at 902.
17. See, e.g., Stover v. Carlson, 413 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Conn. 1976) (“[A]ttorney-client
mail is not treated as privileged unless it is specially stamped ‘attorney-client’ by the sender.”).
18. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974). In Wolff, the Supreme Court
acknowledged a state interest in ensuring that mail between an attorney and inmate did not contain
contraband material, and upheld a statute allowing the mail to be opened and inspected with the
inmate present. Id. at 576–77; see also 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 12:26
(4th ed. 2014) (noting that other lower courts have agreed with the Wolff court on the standard for
confidentiality of attorney mail).
19. See, e.g., Korbe, 2010 WL 2776337, at *3 (analyzing a prison system that automatically
excluded phone conversations with an attorney from monitoring).
20. United States v. Mitchell, No. 3:11-CR-248(S1)-J-34TEM, 2013 WL 3808152, at *10
(M.D. Fla. July 22, 2013) (citing United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 100–01 (1st Cir. 2008))
(discussing the practice of having a list of all local attorneys to prevent recording phone calls
between an inmate and attorney).
21. See United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828–29 (E.D. Va. 2005).
22. Heidi Boghosian, Taint Teams and Firewalls: Thin Armor for Attorney-Client Privilege,
1 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 15, 19–21 (2003). See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2014); 66 Fed.
Reg. 55,062, 55,063–64 (Oct. 31, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 500–01) (discussing the
changes to § 501.3 with respect to the attorney-client privilege).
23. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3; see also 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,062–03.
24. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d).
25. Christopher Zoukis, Federal Bureau of Prisons Allows Inmates to Utilize Monitored
Email Service, PRISON LAW BLOG (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.prisonlawblog.com/blog/federalbureau-of-prisons-allows-inmates-to-utilize-monitored-email-service#.VHC_govF9ig.
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mail is protected by the attorney-client privilege because it carries a reasonable
expectation of privacy.26 However, this same standard does not always apply
for inmates because inmates are forced to waive their right to privacy when they
use the prison e-mail system.27
This Comment suggests that an e-mail between an inmate and his or her
attorney should be treated as a privileged communication that is not discoverable
by the government so long as it otherwise meets privilege requirements. Part I
surveys the historic origins of the attorney-client privilege, both inside and
outside of the prison context. Specifically, it addresses federal cases dealing
with different forms of communication in prison, including in-person visits,
letters, and phone calls. Then, Part I also discusses the recent federal cases in
which courts examined the use of e-mails in prisons. In Part II, this Comment
analyzes the different reasons that e-mails between an inmate and his or her
attorney should be privileged, including constitutional protections and
efficiency. Finally, in Part III, this Comment suggests that the attorney-client
privilege for inmate-attorney communications must adapt in order to apply the
privilege to e-mails in the same way as traditional forms of communication.
I. A HISTORY OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. The Oldest Privilege: The Attorney-Client Privilege
As the oldest privilege, there is a vast amount of federal case law that tracks
the development of the attorney-client privilege. 28 As the Supreme Court
discussed in Upjohn Company v. United States,29 the “purpose [of the privilege]
is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.”30 The Supreme Court further observed that providing
an attorney with all the facts allows that attorney to provide better legal advice

26. See Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327(DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL
1318387, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (employing the Fourth Amendment privacy analysis to
determine the existence of the attorney-client privilege in e-mail communications and finding that
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her e-mail communication). See also Megan
E. McEnroe, E-Mail in Attorney-Client Communications: A Survey of Significant Developments
April 2009–June 2010, 66 BUS. LAW. 191, 192 (2010) (“The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the party asserting the attorney-client privilege had shown an objectively
reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy when an e-mail was transmitted.”).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Walia, No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246,
at *50–51 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014) (noting that inmates’ use of TRULINCS prison e-mail system
is conditioned on consent to monitoring); F.T.C. v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *7–8 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012) (finding that the defendant had waived
the attorney-client privilege for e-mails sent through TRULINCS).
28. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
29. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
30. Id. at 389.
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to his client. 31 Later, in Trammel v. United States, 32 the Court further
extrapolated that lawyers are better able to achieve their “professional mission”
when they have all of the facts.33
In Hunt v. Blackburn,34 the Supreme Court recognized that the privilege was
necessary because legal assistance can only be provided when there was no
“apprehension of disclosure.”35 In addition, the Court stated that this privilege
belonged to the client, and once waived voluntarily by the client, could not be
used to prevent the attorney from divulging information.36
In determining the applicability of attorney-client privilege, the Supreme
Court looks to “the nature of the privilege, its central purpose, the need for
certainty as to the applicability of the privilege, and/or the costs that would be
imposed if the privilege were held to apply to the situation at hand.”37 For the
privilege to apply:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties. (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would
inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.38
The need for this privilege must be weighed against the competing need for the
public to know the truth in an investigation.39
Despite its importance to the proper function of the judicial system, the
attorney-client privilege promotes “withholding relevant information from the
fact-finder,” and, therefore, must be narrowly applied.40 As the Supreme Court
discussed in Fisher v. United States,41 the privilege only covers information that
is necessary for a client to obtain legal advice.42

31. Id.
32. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
33. Id. at 51 (“The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to
know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is
to be carried out.”); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (“The purpose of
the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”).
34. 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
35. Id. at 470.
36. Id.
37. Brian Sheppard, Annotation, Views of United States Supreme Court as to Attorney-Client
Privilege, 159 A.L.R. Fed. 243, 253 (2000).
38. Matthews, supra note 12, at 281 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 527).
39. United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 826 (E.D. Va. 2005).
40. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
41. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
42. Id. at 403.
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B. The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Prison Context
The attorney-client privilege is especially important when the client is an
inmate. Inmates do not have the same right to privacy that free individuals do.43
To counteract their lack of individual freedom, inmates must be able to
communicate with legal professionals.44 As a result, rules and practices that
unnecessarily restrict an inmate’s access to his attorney violate his constitutional
right to access effective counsel. 45 Furthermore, not only do inmates need
access to attorneys, but this access must also be free from intrusion by a third
party.46
Inmates have historically been able to communicate with their attorneys inperson, via written letters, or on the phone.47 While federal courts prefer to
abstain from adjudicating issues of prison administration, they have weighed in
on cases dealing with attorney-client communications.48 As the Supreme Court
discussed in Procunier v. Martinez,49 “courts are ill equipped to deal with the
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform,” but this
“judicial restraint” cannot keep the Court from dealing with “valid constitutional
claims.”50 For example, in Coplon v. United States,51 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia addressed an inmate’s inability to have a private
conversation and held that inmates had a constitutional right to have private
conversations with an attorney.52
1. Attorney-Client In-Person Conversations in Prisons Are Generally
Privileged
Inmates have a constitutional right to speak to an attorney in private.53 For
in-person conversations, inmates and their legal representatives may reasonably
43. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984) (deciding that “society is not
prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have
in his prison cell”); Levenson, supra note 4, § 5:76 (noting that in a jail cell inmates are generally
not entitled to privacy).
44. United States v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that inmates’
communications have the protection of the attorney-client privilege, despite their diminished
expectation of privacy).
45. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989).
46. See supra note 5.
47. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
48. See Procunier, 416 U.S. at 404–05.
49. 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989).
50. Id. at 405.
51. 191 F.2d 749 (1951).
52. Id. at 758–60.
53. See Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1052–53 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that
only allowing inmates to consult with their attorneys in public areas risked the confidentiality of
these communications and consequently violated the inmates’ right to “effective aid of counsel”
(quoting Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 820–21 (8th Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation marks
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assume that their jail visiting room communications are private.54 In Black v.
United States,55 the Supreme Court vacated a conviction because the state had
recorded conversations between the defendant and his attorney.56 Courts have
tied the attorney-client privilege to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy analysis,
finding that the privilege applies to communications recorded by the prison for
which the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 57
Consequently, private conversations between inmates and their attorneys, in
which the inmates have a reasonable expectation of privacy, are protected by the
attorney-client privilege. 58 Therefore, monitoring the private conversations
violates the Fourth Amendment.59
In addition to not monitoring these privileged conversations, prisons must
provide a certain level of quality access to attorneys. 60 In Mitchell v.
Untreiner, 61 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida
determined that the Escambia County Jail had such severe management
problems that the court ordered specific remedies for the jail to implement.62
The court required the jail to provide attorneys access to inmates on a daily basis,
and to provide “adequate facilities” which could “insure the confidentiality of
attorney-client communications.”63 The court also established that there was a
minimum level of quality access that the jail must provide to attorneys
representing inmates.64

omitted)); see also Negron v. Wallace, 436 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that “a detained
juvenile has a constitutional right to consult with an attorney in privacy”).
54. See Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2012); CARR & BELLIA,
supra note 4, § 3:6.
55. 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
56. Id. at 27–29.
57. See, e.g., Gennusa, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1349 (finding the recording of plaintiffs’
conversations to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment since the plaintiffs had reasonably
believed their conversations to be private); Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 419, 435 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (acknowledging that there is a reasonable “expectation of privacy in . . . attorney-client
communications with [inmates]”).
58. See supra note 57.
59. See supra note 57.
60. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 902 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
61. 421 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
62. Id. at 897.
63. Id. at 902.
64. See id. (requiring the prison to provide “[a]ttorneys representing inmates in the Escambia
County Jail [with] access to said inmates at any time within 12 hours of arrest,” and during “normal
visiting hours”).
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2. Written Letters Between Attorneys and Inmates Are Privileged When the
Parties Follow the Applicable Rules
Attorneys and inmates also have a right to communicate through written
letters. 65 In Ex parte Hull, 66 the Supreme Court established the concept of
privileged mail in the context of confirming an inmate’s right to have access to
the courts. 67 Thirty-three years later, the Supreme Court applied the First
Amendment’s freedom of speech protection to inmate mail in Procunier v.
Martinez.68 In Procunier, the Court said that inmate mail could only be censored
if a prison had a policy that both furthered a governmental interest and was
narrowly tailored to achieve only what was necessary.69
Following Procunier, lower courts initiated programs requiring that mail from
an attorney be clearly marked as such.70 For example, a prison may require that
mail from an attorney contain specific markings indicating that it is privileged,
as opposed to just including an attorney’s name and address as the return
address.71 In Stover v. Carlson,72 the U.S. District Court for Connecticut limited
such practices to instances where it was clear to both inmates and attorneys that
a special marking was needed.73 Additionally, according to the U.S. District
Court of Hawaii, in Samonte v. Manlinti, 74 requiring inmates to have their
attorneys mark mail as confidential was an appropriate balance of the prison’s
interest in security and an inmate’s right to communicate with his attorney.75
65. See Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D. N.H. 1977); see also Daniel M.
Donovan, Jr., Constitutionality of Regulations Restricting Prisoner Correspondence with the
Media, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1988) (observing that mail communications between
attorneys and their clients are privileged and that the First Amendment protects the content of those
communications from censorship).
66. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
67. Id. at 548–49 (invalidating a regulation that authorized the warden to intercept inmates’
mail and deciding that “the state and its officers may not abridge or impair [an inmate’s] right to
apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus” and the courts alone will determine the
adequacy of such petitions).
68. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989).
69. Id. (holding that prison officials “must show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship
furthers one or more of the substantial government interests of security, order, and rehabilitation”).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Stotts, 925 F.2d 83, 89–90 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that it was
legal in North Carolina for a prison to require an attorney to specifically mark the confidential
mail); Harrod v. Halford, 773 F.2d 234, 234 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming the lower court’s decision
to uphold a Nebraska mail policy that allowed the opening of mail away from the inmate if it had
not been properly marked); Stover v. Carlson, 413 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Conn. 1976) (noting that
the opening of mail from courts and members of Congress outside the inmates presence “chill[s]”
the inmate’s right of access to the courts).
71. See Stover, 413 F. Supp. at 721–22 (finding that additional markings were required, absent
a Bureau of Prisons regulation requiring additional markings).
72. 413 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1976).
73. Id. at 721–22.
74. No. 05-00598 SOM-BMK, 2007 WL 1963697 (D. Haw. July 3, 2007).
75. Id. at *8.
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In addition to requiring inmates and their attorneys to mark privileged mail,
the Supreme Court has said that prison employees can still open incoming mail
in the presence of an inmate to ensure that there is no contraband in it. 76
However, as addressed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
Bell-Bey v. Williams,77 the review of an inmates’ legal mail requires limitations
and guidelines to restrict the discretion of prison officials.78 Without safeguards,
“it could chill a prisoner’s free expression, communication with counsel, or
access to the courts for fear his jailer reads the contents.”79 For outgoing mail
designated as “special,” inmates may send it unopened.80 However, the prison
may require inmates to supply the names of their attorneys in advance so that an
attorney’s status, as legal counsel, can be verified.81
3. Phone Calls Between Attorneys and Inmates Are Privileged When There
Is No Warning Message
Phone calls between an inmate and an attorney have a different set of rules
than in-person conversations and letters. Phone calls between inmates and their
attorneys are exempted from being recorded. 82 In Coplon, the D.C. Circuit
stated that an inmate and his attorney have a right to speak on the phone without
being recorded by an unknown monitoring device.83 Further, according to the

76. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974) (holding that opening inmates’ mail in
their presences is an appropriate measure and does not constitute censorship because the inmates’
presence would prevent the prison employee from reading it). See also Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d
997, 1014 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Outgoing mail to be licensed attorneys . . . must be sent unopened, and
incoming mail from such sources may be opened only in the presence of the inmate recipient if
considered necessary to determine authenticity or to inspect for contraband. Prisoners may be
required to submit the names of attorneys reasonably in advance of proposed mailings so that
whether the named attorney is licensed may be ascertained.”); see also 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 18,
§ 12:26.
77. 87 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 1996).
78. Bell-Bey v. Williams, 87 F.3d 832, 839 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that a prison’s review of
inmate’s mail did not violate an inmate’s constitutional right to communication with counsel
because the prison had “implemented procedural safeguards” that “sufficiently collar the prison
official’s review of the mail”).
79. Id.
80. Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1983); Jones, 594 F.2d at 1014. For
federal prisons, 28 C.F.R. § 540.18 addresses both incoming and outgoing mail and refers to
privileged mail as “special mail.” 28 C.F.R. § 540.18 (2014). The regulation states that privileged
mail will be opened “only in the presence of the inmate for inspection for physical contraband and
the qualification of any enclosures as special mail,” but not “read or copied if the sender is
adequately identified on the envelope, and the front of the envelope is marked ‘Special Mail—Open
only in the presence of the inmate.’” Id. § 540.18(a). It goes on to say that “outgoing special mail
may be sealed by the inmate and is not subject to inspection.” Id. § 540.18(c)(1). Section 540.19
also discusses procedures for “special mail.” 28 C.F.R. § 540.19.
81. Jones, 594 F.2d at 1014.
82. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
83. Id.
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court, the availability of alternative means of communication does not justify
telephone call surveillance.84
Federal regulations also prohibit prison staff from monitoring calls to
attorneys.85 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed this issue
in United States v. Novak, 86 when a Massachusetts county jail recorded the
phone calls between an inmate and his attorney.87 The jail posted signs warning
that calls were monitored and also played a recording that stated the same
warning at the beginning of calls.88 However, the prison, in an effort to comply
with federal and state law prohibiting prisons from recording phone calls
between attorneys and inmates, kept a list of attorneys and inmates could submit
requests for additional names to be added to the list.89 The list allegedly included
all local Massachusetts lawyers, but in this case it did not include the relevant
attorney.90
The Novak court found that two mistakes had been made in the course of the
phone call monitoring.91 First, the relevant attorney’s number should have been
included on the list.92 Second, once it became clear the calls were legal in nature,
the prison staff should have stopped monitoring the calls.93
However, courts have allowed phone calls between inmates and attorneys to
be recorded when the prison provides a warning that the calls would be
recorded.94 In United States v. Lentz,95 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia said that the parties could not have “reasonably expect[ed]”
their conversation to be private because they had previously heard the recorded
message alerting the participants that the prison recorded the calls.96 According
to the court, as long as there are other means of communicating with an attorney,
prisons can restrict attorney-client phone calls in this way.97

84. Id.
85. 28 C.F.R. § 540.102.
86. 531 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2008).
87. Id. at 100–01. Novak involved an attorney who had participated in illegal acts, but the
court addressed the protections afforded to attorney-client calls. Id.
88. Id. at 100.
89. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 540.102; 103 MASS. CODE REGS. § 482.09 (1994)).
90. Id. at 100–01.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 101.
93. Id.
94. See United States v. Mitchell, No. 3:11-CR-248(S1)-J-34TEM, 2013 WL 3808152, at *10
(M.D. Fla. July 22, 2013) (finding that calls preceded by a warning that they will be monitored or
recorded are not protected by the attorney-client privilege because one of the parties consented to
the recording); United States v. Eye, No. 05-00344-01-CRW-ODS, 2008 WL 1701089, at *11
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 2008).
95. 419 F. Supp. 2d 820 (E.D. Va. 2005).
96. Id. at 828–29.
97. See, e.g., Stamper v. Campbell Cnty., Ky., No. 2007-49 (WOB), 2009 WL 2242410, at
*2 (E.D. Ky. July 24, 2009).
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C. Recent Changes to the Attorney-Client Privilege
1. Developments in the Aftermath of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist
Attacks to Reduce the Attorney-Client Privilege
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
changed its guidelines to allow the Department of Justice (DOJ) to view
communications between federal inmates and their attorneys.98 As part of these
changes, the Attorney General must first show that there is a “reasonable
suspicion” that the written or spoken conversation is facilitating an act of
terrorism.99 Once the Attorney General has “reasonable suspicion,” the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons may view and listen to communications that the
attorney-client privilege has historically protected.100
These changes have altered the traditional contours of the attorney-client
privilege, 101 potentially chilling attorney-client communications, which is a
result that courts have tried to prevent.102 Now, clients and attorneys may feel
unable to share information and speak freely, hindering “an inmate’s Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” 103 In Al-Owhali v.
Ashcroft, 104 the defendant unsuccessfully argued that even though this
regulation had not been used against him yet, it was having a “chilling effect”
on his communications.105
However, the regulation does attempt to provide checks on the government’s
new power. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons must give notice to both the
inmate and his attorney before beginning to monitor any conversations.106 In
addition, the officials monitoring the calls must not be involved in the inmate’s
prosecution. 107 Additionally, except in extraordinary circumstances, if the

98. See Boghosian, supra note 22, at 15.
99. Id. at 19–20; see also 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2014); Prevention of Acts of Violence and
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,063 (Oct. 31, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 500–01)
(discussing the changes to 28 C.F.R. § 501.3).
100. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2007). The guidelines do not explain what reasonable suspicion is,
but the Supreme Court has said that it involves more than an unspecified suspicion, but less than
the level of suspicion required for probable cause. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. See Cole, supra note 1, at 548–52 (discussing the change in 2001 and the criticisms of the
regulation as an unconstitutional interference with an inmate’s right of access to counsel); Sharon
Jaffrey, An Act of Patriotism? Infringing on the Individual’s Sixth Amendment Right to Effective
Counsel, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 165, 166–67 (2004).
102. Boghosian, supra note 22, at 20–21.
103. Jaffrey, supra note 101, at 166–67.
104. 279 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2003).
105. Id. at 22, 29 (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing a facial challenge to
monitoring regulation for lack of standing because the “chilling effect” was too “remote and
uncertain”).
106. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(2) (2014). See Cole, supra note 1, at 549.
107. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3). See Cole, supra note 1, at 549.
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government seeks to use material that was obtained from the monitoring, a
federal judge must approve its use.108
2. Changes in the Forms of Communication: The Rise of E-mail
Technology and the ways in which people communicate with each other are
constantly changing.109 The clearest example of this phenomenon has been the
rise of e-mail, which offers a level of speed and efficiency not previously
available.110 E-mail’s increasing use among legal counsel is in part due to the
fact that it does not require another person’s availability, it provides a written
version of a conversation, and it can be saved and easily accessed later.111
a. Attorney-Client E-mails Outside of the Prison Context
For the general attorney-client privilege, when not involving inmates, courts
have found that parties can have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using
e-mail, except in the context of workplace e-mail accounts. 112 However, in
Convertino v. U.S. Department of Justice,113 the court found that the defendant
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal e-mails from a work account
and that, consequently, those e-mails were protected by the attorney-client
privilege.114 Courts determining the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
to e-mail often employ traditional tests used for other forms of communications,
including looking at whether legal advice was being conveyed and whether there
was an expectation of privacy.115

108. See supra note 107.
109. See Piekarski, supra note 8, at 771.
110. Crotty, supra note 8 (discussing the increasing use of e-mail in legal contexts).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., No. 11-1278, 2012 WL 2501017,
at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2012) (explaining that because the plaintiff’s e-mail was not personal in
any manner, such as a personal e-mail account, and was instead on a work computer, her
expectation of privacy was unreasonable); Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp,
587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that the plaintiff-employer’s monitoring of
the defendant’s e-mails sent from the employer’s computers was distinguishable from workplace
e-mail cases because the defendant had used a personal e-mail account and therefore had a
reasonable expectation of privacy); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–86 (6th
Cir. 2010) (finding that e-mails should be afforded the same protection as other forms of
communication).
113. 674 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d on other ground, 684 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
114. Id. at 110 (finding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails
sent form a work account because he was “unaware that [the employer] would be regularly
accessing and saving e-mails sent from his account”).
115. See, e.g., Owens v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., No. 7:12-CV-144(HL), 2013 WL 6389035, at
*2 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2013) (holding that e-mails with a lawyer recipient were not automatically
privileged because they did not discuss legal advice).

766

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:753

b. Attorney-Client E-mails Sent Using Monitored Work E-mail Accounts
Are Not Protected
Courts have generally found that e-mails sent on monitored workplace
computers do not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy.116 In determining
if certain e-mails are protected, courts often focus on whether the employees
could reasonably have thought their communications were private, taking into
account whether there was an employment policy that provided that the
employer could monitor e-mails.117 For example, in Hanson v. First National
Bank,118 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia found
that, because an employer had a policy stating that the employer could monitor
e-mail sent on a work e-mail system, the employee did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mails sent from work.119
c. A New Conversation: A Trend Toward Not Protecting E-mails Between
Inmates and Their Attorneys
The debate over the protection of e-mails between inmates and their attorneys
is only recently starting to appear in court cases.120 This Comment focuses on
federal cases because federal inmates have access to e-mail via the Trust Fund
Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS).121 States have been slower to
adopt this policy, with many still not giving inmates access to e-mail or the
Internet.122
Among federal courts that have heard the issue, there is a consensus that
because TRULINCS informs inmates that e-mails are monitored, there is no

116. See Dombrowski, 2012 WL 2501017, at *7.
117. Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. CIV.A. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430, at *5 (S.D.W. Va.
Oct. 31, 2011) (explaining that by using a work computer, an employee may have “impliedly
waived confidentiality of the communication afforded by the attorney-client privilege if the
employer has a policy which eliminates any expectation of privacy . . . by prohibiting personal use
of the employer’s computer system and establishing that the employer has ownership of e-mails
and the right to monitor them”).
118. No. CIV.A. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011).
119. Id., at *6.
120. Clifford, supra note 7.
121. 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 18, § 14:15 (quoting Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 755 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
122. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, HANDBOOK FOR THE
FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF NEW YORK STATE DOCCS OFFENDERS 38 (2013), available at
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/FamilyGuide/FamilyHandbook.pdf (explaining that New York offenders
do not have access to e-mail); Frequently Asked Questions, OHIO DEP’T REHAB. & CORR.,
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/faq.htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2014) (stating that Ohio inmates do
not have access to e-mail); How to Contact an Inmate, CAL. DEP’T CORR. & REHAB.,
http://cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/howtocontact.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (stating that
one can only contact California state inmates by mail or phone calls); but see Kimberly Railey,
Some Prisons Let Inmates Connect With Tablets, USA TODAY (Aug. 18, 2013, 3:40 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/17/tabletsforinmates/2651727/.

2015]

Inmates' E-mails with Their Attorneys

767

expectation of privacy and, therefore, the e-mails are not privileged.123 In F.T.C
v. National Urological Group, Inc.,124 the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia found that the defendants had waived their attorney-client
privilege by e-mailing with their attorneys because the inmates had consented to
the monitoring of their e-mail communications.125
However, more recently, there has been a trend toward defendants conceding
that their e-mails are not privileged, and, instead, arguing that the monitoring of
their e-mails violates their constitutional right to access counsel.126 In United
States v. Walia, 127 the defendant acknowledged that his e-mails with his
attorney, sent on the prison e-mail system, were not privileged, but argued they
should not be viewable by the government because government review would
“frustrate[] his right to access counsel.”128 Further, the defendant’s attorney
asserted that e-mail was a more efficient means of contacting his client, allowing
him to “explain matters to his client so that his client [could] make informed
decisions.”129
Despite the ease and speed of attorney-client e-mail communications, in
Walia, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the
prison e-mail system was not privileged and that the inmate’s right of access to
counsel was not violated because he had other ways of communicating with his
lawyer. 130 In addressing the constitutional question, the court acknowledged
that these additional forms of communications may be more “burdensome,” but
that this was not a sufficient reason to find that the prison had violated the
defendant’s constitutional right to have access to counsel.131

123. See United States v. Walia, No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at
*47 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014); United States v. Asaro, No. 14-Cr-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97396, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014); F.T.C. v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012); see also supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
124. No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012).
125. Id. at *6 (holding that the defendant had waived attorney-client privilege “because he had
consented to monitoring and thus had no reasonable expectation of privacy”).
126. See, e.g., Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *47.
127. No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014).
128. Id. at *47 (quoting Docket Entry No. 34 at 1) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(explaining that the defendant’s counsel argued that using e-mail “allows him to meet his ethical
obligations under the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 1.4” and “‘allows busy public
defenders to tend to all of their clients’” (quoting Docket Entry No. 34 at 2–3)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at *48–50 (“‘TRULINCS . . . is a privilege and the BOP has absolute discretion in
determining whether to limit or deny the use of TRULINCS by an inmate’” (quoting Dunlea v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:10-cv-214 (CFD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41134, at *3 (D. Conn. Apr.
26, 2010))).
131. Id. at *49–50 (holding that although the defendant’s counsel recommended a
technological solution, which involved each inmate having two e-mail addresses to allow for emails with attorneys to automatically be separated, as of now the TRULINCS e-mail system “does
not provide for the communication of privileged information”).
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Another recent case with similar arguments is United States v. Asaro.132 In
Asaro, the defendant argued that although his e-mails were not privileged, the
government reading his e-mails frustrates his Sixth Amendment right of access
to counsel because avoiding this official surveillance through using traditionally
protected communications, such as in-person conferences, would not be as
efficient as communicating with his attorney via e-mail.133 The U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York found that this did not violate the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights because he had other forms of privileged
communication with his attorney.134 The court went on to say that, “it would be
a welcome development for . . . [the Bureau of Prisons] to improve TRULINCS
so that attorney-client communications could be easily separated from other emails and subject to protection. However, . . . any inconvenience . . . does not
rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation.”135
The U.S. Attorney’s office for the Eastern District of New York, which
prosecuted both Walia and Asaro,136 proactively asserts a lack of privilege to
inmate’s e-mails.137 On June 9, 2014, the U.S. Attorney’s Office released a letter
explaining that the office would be monitoring e-mails between inmates and
their attorneys sent on TRULINCS because the e-mails are not privileged.138
The letter included several ways in which inmates and attorneys are warned that

132. No. 14-Cr-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014).
133. Id. at *2–3. The defense attorney in the ongoing case of United States v. Syed Imran
Ahmed raised a similar argument in a letter to the judge, arguing that the defendant’s e-mails should
be protected in order to preserve the defendant’s right of access to counsel. Letter from Morris J.
Fodeman to Judge Dora L. Irizarry 1–2 (June 20, 2014), available at http://www.kmbllaw.com/
documents/CorrlinksPrivilegeClaimLetter.pdf. Morris J. Fodeman, the attorney, explained the
difficulties involved in attempting to contact the defendant. Id. at 2–3. The prison does not accept
mail sent “via expedited mail services,” resulting in a wait time of two or more weeks for an inmate
to receive a letter. Id. at 2. This process does not include the time it then takes for the inmate to
respond and to get a letter back to his attorneys. Id. at 2–3. As for phone calls, defense attorneys
often have to spend an extended amount of time attempting to get their calls pre-approved. Id.
Visiting the defendant in prison can take a total of five hours, which costs the taxpayers $600 for
the visit alone, because the defense attorney is paid by the taxpayers. Id.
134. Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *3–4 (holding that the prison’s system did not
“‘unreasonably interfere’” with the defendant’s access to counsel and that the defendant did not
assert “any interference with his ability to consult counsel through these other media, other than his
counsel’s expending time and funds on traveling to visit him and the inconvenience of having to
arrange phone calls in advance”).
135. Id. at *4.
136. See Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *1; Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396,
at *1.
137. See Letter from James G. McGovern, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division,
E. Dist. of N.Y., to Peter Kirchheimer, Attorney-in-Charge, Federal Defenders of N.Y. (June 9,
2014), available at http://nylawyer.nylj.com/adgifs/decisions14/072214letter.pdf.
138. Id. (noting initial user agreements, warnings when users logged in, and notifications to
users of the TRULINCS system).
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the prisons monitor e-mails.139 First, inmates consent to monitoring in order to
gain access to TRULINCS.140 Second, non-inmate users are also warned that
the prisons monitor all communications.141 Third, every time inmates log onto
TRULINCS they are again warned that the prison monitors e-mails, and inmates
must click “I accept,” acknowledging their consent to the monitoring.142
Other federal courts have not been as accepting of the government
surveillance of e-mails between inmates and attorneys. For example, in United
States v. Aguilar,143 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
suggested that e-mails between an inmate and her attorney were protected.144
Aguilar involved an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) who had accessed
e-mails between an inmate and her attorneys and shared them with the
prosecution.145 The AUSA claimed she had the court’s permission to do so.146
Ultimately, the court suppressed the e-mails, finding that the AUSA was not
authorized to monitor or share the communications. 147 The Aguilar decision
suggests that the Central District of California affords inmates’ e-mails more
protection than the Eastern District of New York.
II. DIFFERENT MOTIVATIONS FOR MAKING E-MAILS BETWEEN INMATES AND
ATTORNEYS PRIVILEGED
The cases concerning e-mails between inmates and their attorneys have
featured different legal arguments to support e-mail’s protection from
surveillance, including the attorney-client privilege, the constitutional right to
access counsel, and efficiency. Although not used in recent e-mail cases, the
constitutional right of freedom of speech, 148 the right to petition the

139. Id. (stating that user agreements inform TRULINCS users that they are “notified of,
acknowledge and voluntarily consent to having [their] messages and transaction data . . . monitored,
read, retained by Bureau staff and otherwise handled” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Ca. 2011).
144. Id. at 1193–94 (observing that “the [c]ourt granted Aguilar’s motion to suppress” the
prosecution’s improper use of “communications between Aguilar and her attorneys”).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1194.
147. Id. (concluding and admitting that “[t]he prosecutors never requested [the] court[’s]
permission to obtain [the e-mails]”).
148. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989) (holding that censorship of inmate mail is acceptable when there is a
“substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression” and “the limitation
of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of
the particular governmental interest involved”); Bell-Bey v. Williams, 87 F.3d 832, 839 (6th Cir.
1996) (explaining that a policy directing prison officials to read attorney-client mail would “chill a
prisoner’s free expression”).
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government, 149 and the right to due process 150 have also been used in cases
dealing with attorney-client privilege and its attendant privacy interest generally.
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The first defense for preventing the government from looking at inmateattorney e-mails is the attorney-client privilege.151 However, this argument has
not been successful. For example, in F.T.C. v. National Urological Group,
Inc.,152 the court addressed the question of attorney-client privilege and found
that the defendants had waived their attorney-client privilege.153 The court held
that the privilege was waived because the inmate used TRULINCS, which
notified him that his e-mails would be monitored. 154 In more recent cases,
parties have conceded this argument, and instead proceeded to the constitutional
claim of access to counsel.155
The courts’ analysis for attorney-client privilege in e-mails is similar to the
analysis for phone calls. In United States v. Lentz, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia found that phone calls were not privileged when
parties were alerted that their calls were being recorded because they could not
have had a reasonable expectation of privacy.156 Therefore, the courts seem to
agree that when an inmate is put on notice that a phone call or e-mail is being
monitored, the attorney-client privilege does not apply.
B. A Constitutional Right to Access Counsel
Parties have now started to concede the attorney-client privilege argument,
and instead focus on the constitutional argument of the right to counsel.157 This

149. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969)) (“[P]risoners have the constitutional right to petition the Government for redress of their
grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.”).
150. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (citing Neufield v. United
States, 118 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir.)) (explaining that due process involves an inmate having
“effective and substantial aid of counsel”). The court went on to say that a person accused of a
crime could not have “effective aid of counsel” if he could not converse privately with the attorney.
Id.
151. F.T.C. v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *5
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012).
152. No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012).
153. Id. at *5–6.
154. Id.
155. United States v. Asaro, No. 14-Cr-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, *1–2
(E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014).
156. United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828–29 (E.D. Va. 2005).
157. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *1–2.
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argument was used to no avail in United States v. Asaro, F.T.C. v. National
Urological Group, Inc., and United States v. Walia.158
In Asaro, the argument did not work because the court found that a lack of
access to privileged e-mails did not deprive the defendant of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel because there are a myriad of alternative means of
communicating with his attorney.159 The court noted that instead of restricting
inmates’ ability to communicate with their attorneys, the prison actually
improved inmates’ access to the outside world and counsel by allowing inmates
to use TRULINCS.160
In F.T.C., the court rejected this same argument for two reasons.161 First, the
court found that the prison had not violated the defendant’s constitutional rights
because he consented to the monitoring of his e-mails and, therefore, had no
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”162 Second, the court found that because it
was a civil contempt proceeding, the Sixth Amendment did not apply.163
In Walia, the court did not find the defendant’s right to counsel argument
persuasive for similar reasons as those in Asaro.164 The court stated that the
defendant was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because he
had additional ways of communicating with his attorney.165 Specifically, the
court found that although it “may not agree with the position of the United States
Attorney’s Office to review non-privileged e[-]mail communications between
inmates and their attorneys communicated over a monitored system, the [c]ourt
has no legal basis to find that the fundamental right of access to effective
assistance of counsel . . . is compromised.”166
Parties have made similar arguments in cases dealing with phone calls
between inmates and their attorneys. 167 In Coplon, the court stressed the
importance of allowing an inmate to “privately . . . consult with counsel.”168 The
court reasoned that even if the inmate had other ways to communicate with his
attorney, because the right of access to counsel is important, phone calls should
still not be intercepted.169

158. United States v. Walia, No. 14–CR–213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *47–
51 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014); Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *1–4; F.T.C., 2012 WL
171621, at *6.
159. Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *3–4
160. Id. at *4.
161. F.T.C., 2012 WL 171621, at *5–8.
162. Id. at *6.
163. Id.
164. United States v. Walia, No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *49–
51 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014). See Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *3–4.
165. Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *49–50.
166. Id. at *50.
167. See Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
168. Id. at 758.
169. Id. at 759.
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C. The Efficiency of E-mail
Beyond the legal arguments for protecting attorney-client e-mails, there are
practical reasons to do so as well. Attorneys have argued that e-mails are a more
efficient means of communication with their incarcerated clients.170 As the court
admitted in Asaro, it is not only “easier but also more efficient and cost-effective
if their communications regarding defense preparation could be conducted
through privilege-protected emails.”171 This is especially important when the
public, and not a private client, is paying for legal services.172
The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ website outlines the several steps involved in
visiting an inmate.173 The visits can take hours between driving to and from the
prison, going through security, and actually conducting the visit.174 While phone
calls can be an easy form of communication for those on the outside, a phone
call to an inmate can also be extremely time consuming because it requires
getting approval for an un-monitored call.175 And while letters themselves may
not take much time to write, the time it takes for them to get to the inmate, and
then to get back to the attorney, can sometimes run up to several weeks.176
Attorneys in both Asaro and Walia relied on the efficiency argument to
support their claim that the government should not be reading the defendants’ emails to their attorneys. 177 However, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York was not persuaded by this argument in either case.178 The
court in Asaro said that although it understood that it would be “more efficient
and cost-effective if their communications regarding defense preparation could
be conducted through privilege-protected e-mails, there is insufficient legal basis
for the argument that [the Bureau of Prisons’] failure to provide a privileged
170. See United States v. Asaro, No. 14-Cr-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014).
171. Id. As the defense attorney in Syed Imran Ahmed outlined in his letter to the judge, the
other three ways for attorneys to communicate with inmates—in-person, letter, and phone call—
are very time consuming for the attorneys. Letter from Morris J. Fodeman to Judge Dora L. Irizarry,
supra note 133, at 2–3.
172. See id. at 3.
173. General Visiting Information, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/inmates/
visiting.jsp (last visited May 11, 2015) (explaining that before visiting an inmate one must locate
the inmate, get approval to be on the inmate’s visiting list, prepare for all of the rules and procedures
for a prison visit, and plan a visit based on the hours and location of the prison). However, as the
defense attorney mentioned in Syed Imran Ahmed, there are generally requirements for preapproval that involve extensive planning in advance. Letter from Morris J. Fodeman to Judge Dora
L. Irizarry, supra note 133, at 2–3.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id. at 2–3.
176. See id. at 2.
177. United States v. Walia, No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *48–
49 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014); United States v. Asaro, No. 14-Cr-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97396, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014).
178. Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *49–50; Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396,
at *3–4.
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form of email communication infringes . . . [the] right to counsel.”179 The court
in Walia took a similar approach, stating that, “[a]lthough the [c]ourt
understands and appreciates [the] [d]efendant’s desire to have quick and easy
access to his counsel by e-mail,” there was “no legal basis” to conclude that an
inability to e-mail with one’s attorney violates the Sixth Amendment’s right of
access to counsel.180
III. A MODERN SOLUTION FOR AN OLD CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
The attorney-client privilege has been recognized in the American legal
system longer than any other privilege.181 It is a vital part of a defendant’s ability
to receive effective legal counsel and fair access to the courts.182 The privilege
was previously extended to three common forms of communication—in-person
visits, letters, and phone calls.183 And yet, as technology has changed and a new
form of communication, e-mail, has become part of society, the law has not
adapted accordingly.
E-mail has integrated itself into every other facet of American culture and
life.184 Prisons took a positive step forward by granting inmates access to email.185 However, they need to take the next step by treating attorney-client emails, sent on TRULINCS, in the same manner as other forms of privileged
communication that inmates can access.
This issue is new to federal courts. Of the courts faced with this question,
several have said that they are forced to find that these e-mails are not privileged,
and, therefore, prosecutors and prison officials can access the e-mails.186 Even
though courts were sympathetic to the inmates’ arguments in these cases, it ruled
against them, citing current privilege doctrine and alternate means of
communication, which prevent a lack of confidential e-mail from rising to the
level of a Sixth Amendment violation.187
The current approach is based on the assumption that the e-mails are not
privileged because inmates consent to e-mail monitoring when they log on to
179. Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *3.
180. Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *49–50.
181. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note
1).
182. Id.
183. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989) (discussing communication by letter); Negron v. Wallace, 436 F.2d
1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1971) (evaluating in-person communication); Coplon v. United States, 191
F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (analyzing telephone communications).
184. See Crotty, supra note 8, § 62:41.
185. See United States v. Asaro, No. 14-Cr-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014) (lauding the Bureau of Prisons for “significantly increase[ing] inmates’
ability to communicate with the outside world” by implementing TRULINCS).
186. United States v. Walia, No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *49–
50 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014); Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *4.
187. See supra note 186.
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TRULINCS.188 However, the same argument could be made for phone calls that
are monitored.189 Yet, with phone calls, courts have held that while officials
may monitor them generally, phone calls between attorneys and inmates are
privileged and protected by the Sixth Amendment and therefore may not be
monitored if inmates follow certain rules.190 This rule should apply to e-mails
as well. Prisons should generally monitor e-mails, but with an exception for
attorney-client e-mails, so that there is no warning for those conversations. This
would provide a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus, a privilege.
Although e-mail should be treated as privileged, there is also a strong
argument that e-mail should not be discoverable by the government because it
infringes on an inmate’s right to access counsel.191 The same constitutional
impetus—which requires prisons to allow inmates to communicate with their
attorneys via in-person visits, phone calls, and letters—should apply to e-mail.
However, courts argue that there are sufficient alternative forms of
communication.192 This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, it is arbitrary
to say that three forms of communication are enough and four would be too
many. Second, the fourth form is more efficient and effective than the previous
three.
E-mail is efficient.193 It allows an attorney to communicate more easily with
his client about a time sensitive matter and receive a timely response. In cases
with complicated documents, this efficiency is necessary for the attorney to
effectively represent the client.194 It also allows an attorney, especially a public
defender, to do all of this from home or work, as opposed to spending hours
getting to and from the prison, hours attempting to get phone call approval, or
weeks waiting for letters to make it to and from the prison.195
The solution to this problem is to treat e-mail communications between
inmates and their attorneys as privileged, in the same way that the other forms
of communication are already treated as privileged. Arguably, there are many
ways to do this, but the best is to treat inmate e-mails in the same manner as
188. Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *49–50.
189. See United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 100 (1st Cir. 2008) (describing two ways that
inmates using the phone are put on notice that the call is monitored).
190. Id. at 100–04 (holding that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to private
conversations with his attorney, but that the official’s monitoring did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because the inmate consented to the monitoring when he used the phone, despite a
warning that the prison was listening to the call).
191. See, e.g., Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *2 (stating the defendant’s argument
that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel is impeded when a prison monitors
the inmate’s e-mails with his attorney).
192. Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *49–51.
193. Crotty, supra note 8, § 62:41 (discussing the benefits of e-mail in the legal context).
194. Letter from Morris J. Fodeman to Judge Dora L. Irizarry, supra note 133, at 2 (explaining
why, in a case involving thousands of pages of discovery, privileged e-mail communications
between an inmate and his attorney are essential to the inmate’s right of access to counsel).
195. Id. at 2–3.
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phone calls. E-mails are most similar to phone calls because nothing physical
can be passed back and forth, as can be done with a visit or a letter. Therefore,
the prison cannot justify e-mail monitoring on the basis of uncovering
contraband. However, while phone calls may be monitored,196 the federal rules
provide for the protection of properly placed phone calls between attorneys and
clients.197 The e-mail rules should follow the federal phone call rules that protect
the attorney-client privilege.
In coming up with a solution that treats e-mails like phone calls, the first step
is to eliminate the warning that is included in the TRULINCS system. Currently,
inmates are warned that the prison monitors all conversations.198 TRULINCS
needs to be updated so that e-mails between inmates and their attorneys are not
monitored. If prisons are not able to change the message on TRULINCS, there
needs to be a prison wide policy that filters e-mails between inmates and
attorneys out of the general pool to prevent the government from monitoring
them.
Additionally, the prisons need to require inmates and their attorneys to ensure
that the e-mail addresses of the attorneys are on the prison’s list of e-mails not
to monitor. This approach is similar to the phone call and letter systems already
in place.199 It would be impossible for a prison to have a list of every local
attorney’s email address. There are always new attorneys, and people tend to
change their e-mail addresses more frequently than people historically did with
phone numbers. Therefore, the burden should rightfully be placed on inmates
and their attorneys to update the prison list with the e-mail addresses of the
attorneys in order to ensure their communications are protected.
As with the other forms of communication, cases where an inmate does not
follow the rules to ensure the inmate has privileged conversations can result in
a waiver of the inmate’s right to a privileged conversation.200 However, for this
to be appropriate, prisons must ensure that all requirements and systems are
adequately explained and advertised to both inmates and their attorneys.
IV. CONCLUSION
The attorney-client privilege is an integral part of an individual’s right to due
process, counsel, free speech, and to petition. As such an important privilege, it
is crucial, especially in the setting of prisons, that the law adapts to changes in
technology. One technology that has revolutionized the way legal representation
is conducted is e-mail communication. However, the law and the prison system
196. United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828–29 (E.D. Va. 2005).
197. 28 C.F.R. § 540.102 (2014).
198. See F.T.C. v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at
*5–6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012) (“TRULINCS requires prisoners using the system to consent to
monitoring and warns that communications with attorneys are not privileged.”).
199. See United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 100–01 (1st Cir. 2008); Stover v. Carlson, 413
F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Conn. 1976); see also 28 C.F.R. § 540.102.
200. See supra note 190 and accompanying text; see also F.T.C., 2012 WL 171621, at *5.
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have not adapted to allow inmates to have privileged communications via e-mail.
The law needs to be changed so that e-mails are given the same privileged
treatment as in-person visits, letters, and phone calls. This change should be
achieved by changing the language on TRULINCS, the inmates’ e-mail access
system, so that the parties can enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy, which,
in turn, will allow the courts to prevent the government from monitoring the emails between inmates and pre-approved attorneys.

